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The recently celebrated (September 8, 2001) anniversary of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty and the U. S∴Japan Security Treaty provides an opportune time to reflect on
the current status of U. S.-Japan relations, and to speculate about their future direction.
Over the course of the past half-century, Japan and the United States have forged a
strong partnership based on a multitude of common ideals and goals: Asia-Pacific
stability, the preservation and promotion of political and economic freedoms, support
for human rights and democratic institutions, and economic prosperity. Today the
United States and Japan stand as two of the world's foremost powers, inextricably
linked in a complex web of interdependent interests, and both parties also recognize the
realpolitik imperative of maintaining good relations. As in any partnership, U. S∴Japan
relations are continuously evolving. At this point in history both countries are also
experiencing significant internal change. Japan in particular appears to be undergoing
major political, social and economic transitions, and these domestic changes will inevi-
tably influence the conduct of its international affairs. With this in mind, it is the intent
of this paper to discuss a sampling of perspectives from western Japan on the current
state of U. SニJapan relations, with particular attention to a few broad aspects (the
security alliance, Japan's international role, economic issues, domestic politics, and
media image) , and their attendant implications for U. S. policy toward Japan.
Rather血an considering conventionally Tokyo-centric viewpoints, this author queried
a cross-section of opinion leaders in western Japan (Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto areas, col-
lectively called the Kansai area, as well as Hiroshima) to garner non-Tokyo perspec-
tives. As anyone who has lived in or worked with Japan knows, Tokyo is the indisput-
able center of the infamous "iron triangle" of Japanese politics, business, and bureau-
cracy which has traditionally controlled the policy formulation process. Like
Washington, Tokyo leaders have sometimes been accused of being oblivious to ideas
and concerns "beyond the beltway", or outside the Tokyo megalopolis, and there has
been growing criticism that the Tokyo-centered policy apparatus is constrained by its
incestuous pursuit of vested interests". What is more, Kansai observers report a
heightened sense of political alienation due to the relative lack of representation in the
government. Much of the actual work of governance is carried out by career bureau-
crats in the respective ministries, who consequently wield significant political power.
1) For a more detailed discussion of the symbiotic relationship between Japanese business, politics and bureau-
cracy, see Michael H. Armacost, Friends or Rivals? (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996) p. 208.
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Most of these top officials are drawn from Tokyo's elite universities, leaving Japanese
from other regions feeling somewhat excluded from the virtual Tokyo monopoly of the
ministries.
Western Japan, including the Kansai area, presents a good representative microcosm
of the Japan outside of Tokyo: with about 20% of the country's population and the
world s eighth largest economy, Kansai encompasses both large urban centers as well as
rural agricultural areas, manufacturing and industrial enterprises as well as distin-
guished academic and cultural institutions. As the pre-war commercial center oりapan,
Osaka in particular has a long tradition of trade and commerce, and locals pride
themselves on their business acumen, pragmatism and resourcefulness. Commerce
became so predominant in the Osaka culture that the traditional greeting in the local
dialect (Osaka-ben) is "How's business? (moukari-makka?) ". Whereas Tokyo residents
have a reputation for being reserved, indirect and sophisticated, Kansai people have
been characterized as candid, straightforward and down-to earth. Thus western Japan
provides an ideal window through which to glimpse a view of local perspectives, and it
is this vantage point that is reflected herein.
The U. S.-Japan Security Alliance
More than any o也er facet of the relationship, to many Japanese the security alliance
is血e aspect which most defines U. S∴Japan relations. Even before the events of Sep-
tember ll forced world powers to choose allegiance in the war against terrorism, there
had been a long-simmering debate in Japan over the future of the security alliance with
the United States. Generally speaking, my interlocutors felt that the majority of
Japanese agree that the alliance has served them well. With a "Peace Constitution" that
prohibits the development of an offensive military, and under the protection of the U. S.
nuclear umbrella, Japan has developed from a war-ravaged nation into the world's sec-
ond largest economy. Most Japanese, and particularly the older generation, appreciate
the significance of the alliance in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region over
the past 50 years, while also enabling Japan to focus on rapidly developing its economic
prosperity2'. And yet observers report a decided ambivalence, an uneasy dissatisfaction
2) This begrudging acceptance of the U. S. security role is widespread in Asia. Chong Guan and See Sung Tan
note that "Many Europeans - and, needless to say, East Asians - still regard the U. S. role as salient to the
existing international order... Complaints of U. S. roguishness or trigger-happy behavior aside, there remains
the strong if painful awareness that, if not for the existing security framework provided by bilateral and
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with the status quo. In a country where consensus is highly regarded and change is
approached with cautious deliberation, debate seems to begin at the edges and nibble its
way to the centrist mainstream of public opinion. What began as emotional and strident
criticism of the alliance at the far poles of the Japanese political spectrum is now shap-
mg into a more modulated, serious discourse on the future of Japan's security policy.
On the left end of the political spectrum, in western Japan as well as nationwide,
there has long been a small but significant minority that advocates a policy of "neutral
pacifism" for Japan. Grounded in an ideological abhorrence of war and redoubled by
Japan s experience in the Second World War, this movement supports the total rejection
of any military role or alliance for Japan. Proponents, most notably from the Social
Democratic Party (Shakai Minshuto), include a sizeable following of middle-aged
women and also a surprising number of teachers, from the elementary through univer-
sity levels. (Some Kansai residents even expressed concern that teachers were unduly
influencing impressionable Japanese schoolchildren with their Leftist philosophies.) The
pacifists envision a nation that embraces peace and seizes血e high ground of neutrality
to avoid potential military conflict. They would like Japan to serve as a force for peace
m the world and a model for other countries to follow. Some factions go so far as to
assert that the very existence of the Self Defense Forces (SDF), created in 1954. is
itself a violation of the constitutional ban on the maintenance of forces3'.
At the local level, a vocal minority of Kobe residents view security relations with the
U. S. through the perspective of the 1975 Kobe Declaration, which provides that any
military ships calling at Kobe ports must assert that they are not carrying nuclear
weapons. Although this is intended as an anti-nuclear measure, it has come to be
regarded as anti-American because U. S. ships as a matter of policy decline to either
confirm or deny their non-nuclear status (even if they are indeed non-nuclear) and thus
have not been welcome at the port of Kobe. Several foreign affairs experts faulted the
Japanese central government for failing to abide by the terms of its bilateral agreement
multilateral alliance commitments borne by the United States, the world could, or perhaps would, be a more
perilous place. See Chong Guan and See Sung Tan, "The Keystone of World Order", The Washington
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 99.
3) Chapter II, Article 9 0f the Japanese Constitution reads :
"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling interna-
tional disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war
potential, will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognized."
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and allowing municipal regulations to override national treaty obligations. While many
Kobe residents view the Declaration as passe, in the recent (October, 2001) Kobe
mayoral election, none of the candidates dared to oppose the Kobe Declaration for fear
of losing political support from the crucial socialist and communist party bases.
Meanwhile, down the coast at the port of Osaka, when the U. S. S. Vincennes called for
a routine port visit in November, 2001 , it was met by about one hundred well-organized
protesters who paraded quietly on the dock for the requisite time before laying down
their placards and joining the nearly 12,000 0仇er locals who enjoyed a guided tour of
the aegis-class vessel. Further down the coast, Hiroshima's tragic history has spawned a
strong international peace movement with that city as its symbolic center. Yet, while
acknowledging the important contributions of the peace organizations, forward-looking
leaders in Hiroshima are anxious to move beyond the victim mentality of the anti-
nuclear movement that would base Japan's international policy on that one-dimensional
issue. Many foreign affairs experts in western Japan dismiss neutral pacifism as an
unrealistic ideal for a modern nation, but admit that the Japanese have a general sym-
pathy for pacific sentiment that cannot be discounted since it has a significant influence
in tempering the security debate.
At也　other political extreme, an even smaller minority of right-wing conservatives,
such as the controversial, outspoken governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, favors the
outright abandonment of the U. S.-Japan security alliance and the rapid development of
a state-of the-art military whereby Japan could declare independence from American
security dominance. Harshly critical of what they perceive as Japan's postwar subservi-
ence to U. S. military, economic and political interests, they urge the country's leaders
to emerge from the shadow of their superpower ally and propel Japan to its rightful
position among the global powers. These are the same conservative academics and
politicians who caused a stir df controversy over their attempts to reinterpret Japanese
history in school textbooks. Such ultra-nationalism not only alienates Japanese
moderates who fear a resurgence of right-wing militarism, but also alarms Japan's
Asian neighbors who suffered at the hands of the Japanese imperial army. Moderate
politicians in western Japan believe that right-wing nationalism does not have a strong
appeal among the populace at present, but worry that a further deterioration of
domestic economic conditions could leave some elements of Japanese society vulnerable
to exploitation by extremist groups.
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Western Japan commentators agree that the pragmatic majority of Japanese support
the continuation of the security alliance with the United States as the best possible
arrangement, given Japan's own constraints as well as　也e current world situation.
From a practical standpoint, an economically strapped Japan can ill afford to take on
the enormous expense of developing a completely self-sufficient military force equipped
with advanced weapon systems, much of which would be unnecessarily redundant with
American assets. Moreover, Article 9　0f the Japanese constitution presents a self-
imposed legal constraint against the formation of a true military force. While sensitive
to the accusation that Japan is shirking its international security responsibilities by
"hiding" behind the peace constitution, my interlocutors maintained that popular
attitudes toward the constitution are complex. The question of whether or not the con-
stitution should be amended has long been debated but still remains highly con-
troversial. Many Japanese, particularly the older generation, have a strong emotional
attachment to the constitution, which served as the foundation for仙e modern Japanese
state, and which has come to be associated wi也the political stability and prosperity仇e
country has enjoyed over the past 50 years. To them, the constitution has acquired a
virtual sacred cow stature and there seems to be a visceral aversion to any form of
alteration or amendment. But the younger generation does not share this emotional
attachment to the constitution, and is much more receptive to the prospect of change.
Undeterred by the technical limitations of the constitution, the Japanese government
has sometimes applied a very broad interpretation of Article 9 to suit its policy
exigencies. (Although this tactic was rejected by the Diet in responding to也e Septem-
ber ll crisis, instead passing也e separate "Anti-Te汀orism Special Measures Law".)
There have been locally based proposals to officially codify a liberal interpretation of
Article 9 that would formalize the right to collective self-defense and give the govern-
merit broader powers in dispatching the SDF, but some opponents argue that the consti-
tutional ambiguity actually allows greater flexibility to respond to unforeseen emer-
gencies. Observers in western Japan note that the constitutional debate has intensified
since the events of September ll. The Japanese public, including most Kansai
residents, were strongly supportive of the government's decision to dispatch Japanese
self-defense forces (still within the confines of the constitution) to provide rear guard
support for the U. S.- led anti-terrorist actions in Afghanistan. Opinion leaders welcome
the public debate on crucial security issues as healthy and long-overdue, hoping it will
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lead to a less polemical, more rational and constructive discussion of the issues and
eventual informed action, perhaps even a public referendum on the issue of constitu-
tional reform4'.
Exasperated by the vagaries of constitutional interpretation, a growing number of
moderate realists and progressive thinkers (both in western Japan and countrywide)
advocate a stronger role for Japan within the context of the existing security alliance
with the United States. Many of them would like to see the constitution eventually
changed to give Japan the unfettered ability to participate fully in global security
issues51. In the meantime, unless and until the Japanese public is ready to accept consti-
tutional reform, they argue that even within the constraints of Article 9 much can be
done to improve the alliance and strengthen Japan's security posture. According to this
view, first and foremost, Japan should insist on a more equal partnership with the
United States and correct the real and perceived imbalances in the alliance. Acknowl-
edging widespread criticism that也e alliance has been dominated by American interests,
progressive moderates (for want of a better label) charge the Japanese government
with passively acquiescing to a subordinate role it has long since outgrown. Rather than
actively assuming a greater share of血e security burden, Japan has tried (wi也mcreas-
mgly disappointing results) 6) to buy off its responsibilities by resorting to "checkbook
diplomacy." Instead, they believe Japan should develop a clear international policy
based on its own national interests, and vigorously assert those interests within the
U. S.-Japan security alliance.
Proponents of this view point to concrete measures that Japan can immediately
undertake to improve existing security arrangements. A more serious, higher level focus
4) The U. S. Government has studiously avoided taking a position on this issue. In a January 1, 2002 interview
with The Japan Times, U. S. Ambassador to Japan Howard H. Baker, Jr. said, "The question of collective
defense is one that Japan must address. It is not appropriate for me to comment, nor for the U. S. govern-
ment to try to advise Japan on how it conducts it岳elf in that field, given the requirements of the Japanese
constitution.
5) An INSS Special Report did not avoid taking a strong position on this issue: "Japan's prohibition against col-
lective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and
more efficient security cooperation. This is a decision that only the Japanese people can make. The United
States has respected the domestic decisions that form the character of Japanese security policies and should
continue to do so. But Washington must make clear that it welcomes a Japan that is willing to make a
greater contribution and to become a more equal alliance partner." Richard L. Armitage et al, The United
States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Pat勿　　(Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University, October, 2000) Subsequently known simply as "the Armitage Report," this report gained
significance when several of the authors were appointed to high level positions at the NSC, State, and
Defense Departments in the new Bush Administration.
6) Japanese officials and academics are still smarting from western criticism that Japan's $ 13 billion contribu-
tion to the 1990 Gulf War effort was "too little, too late."
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is needed to expedite implementation of the 1997 revised Guidelines for U. S.-Japan
Defense Cooperation and the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
agreement, both of which include worthy revisions that have been progressing slowly. A
particularly important provision of the SACO agreement is a critical review of the
number and distribution of U. S. forces in Japan, which most Japanese believe is too
large, especially as currently concentrated in the Okinawa area. Residents of western
Japan (and other areas where there are no U. S. military facilities) recognize the strate-
gic importance of the American bases but have ambivalent feelings of relief at not host-
ing a base "in their backyard" and guilt over Okinawa's disproportionate burden (75%)
of bases. Pundits in western Japan maintain that the efficient coordination of U. S.
forces and Japanese Self Defense Forces can be greatly improved by clarifying respec-
tive roles and responsibilities, increasing joint planning, training and operations ex-
ercises, rationalizing and integrating functions to eliminate redundancies, formalizing
emergency response procedures, and improving intelligence sharing. What is more, all
of these measures should be undertaken with a view toward Japan's long-term national
interests and preparation for possible transition to a more independent defense
capability. In that regard, progressives would also urge Japan to give more considera-
tion to the multilateral implications of the security alliance, leaving open the possibility
of future regional security agreements.
Japan s International Role
There was general consensus among my Kansai interlocutors that Japan can and
should play a stronger role in the international arena. They report that Japanese people
increasingly recognize that, as a major world power, Japan should not limit its interna-
tional contributions to the economic sphere alone, and there is growing public support
for more active and expanded participation in global issues, international organizations,
NGOs, and multilateral groups7'. Political critics of all stripes call for the government
to develop and articulate a pragmatic international policy without undue influence from
Washington. The big question seems to be whether Japan can play a world role com-
mensurate with its economic power while still maintaining a national policy of peaceful
7) See Makoto Iokibe (Professor of Diplomatic I壬istory, KObe University) on the role of Japan as a "global
civilian power" in "Japan After the Cold War" (The Japan Center for International Exchange [2002] jcie.or.
jp/thinknet/insights/i okibe.html)
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neutrality.
The majority of Japanese, both in western Japan and nationwide, would like to see
Japan succeed in its bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.
They feel it would er血ance their international prestige, bolster national pride, and earn
Japan deserved recognition as a leader of the world community. The United States also
supports Japan s bid for UNSC permanent membership. After all, Japan contributes
20.6% of the UN budget, more than any other member nation except the United States.
But some academics expressed concern that many Japanese do not fully realize the
implications of Security Council membership. A permanent member vote is crucial to
也e decision-making process, and Japan would be obliged to make serious judgments
that might affect the outcome of major world events. Japan would no longer be able to
remain passively above the fray, and to criticize Security Council decisions from the
sidelines, but would be an integral part of the process. In so doing, Japan might also
incur the antagonism of some of the member nations. Reconciling Security Council
obligations with its constitutional restraints on the use of force would also pose serious
policy challenges for Japan8', not least in the area of PKO participation. In fact, a
UNSC seat might have a greater impact on Japan than on the UN itself. Kansai com-
mentators note that the Japanese government is eager to obtain permanent Security
Council member status, and believe there are some important considerations for仙e
United Nations as a whole. If admitted, Japan would be the first non-nuclear power to
gain a permanent seat on the Security Council. This would be a significant symbol of
the United Nations'renewed emphasis on peaceful policies for the 21st century. Some
progressives would like to see Japan use its position on the council to work for reform
of the veto-voting system. In their view, the international situation has changed dramat-
ically since the establishment of the United Nations, and the veto system has rendered
the UN increasingly dysfunctional as key members have unilaterally blocked UN action
on important issues9'. While the long-established permanent members are unlikely to
8) Prime Minister Koizumi is quite clear on this subject : "…the five permanent members of the Security Council
take it for granted that… resorting to threats of the use of force or the use of force can be tolerated as a
means of resolving international conflicts in some cases. Japan is different. Should there be an international
dispute, Japan could not support the threat of or use of force if it were a member of the Security Council.
Japan can only make its contributions in non-military areas. It is with that clear understanding that I believe
Japan should raise its hand and say it wants to become a member of the Security Council." From an
interview published in the Fall, 2001 issue of Chum Koron, as quoted in New Per呼ective Quarterly, Vol. 18, No.
4(Fall2001).
9) As an example of the misuse of the veto, one foreign affairs expert cited the UN Security Council vote on
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initiate voting reform, Japan could provide a fresh and objective reform impetus that
would better represent the interests of the majority general membership.
In other areas, political observers in western Japan were pleased to note that the
government is drafting important changes to the regulations governing participation of
Japanese self-defense forces in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). In accordance
with the constitution, the current provisions set strict conditions aimed at precluding the
use of weapons, and these will be revised to give Japan more flexibility to participate in
PKOs. Japan is already sending forces to East Timor as part of仇e UN force there, and
that is seen as a step in the right direction. Moreover, polls indicate that a majority of
Japanese support increased participation of the SDF in UN and other multilateral
operations provided it is within the existing confines of the constitution. While some
isolationist elements argue that Japan should shun international involvement and focus
on domestic issues, most academics and journalists would like to see Japan contribute
more to international policy debate and conflict resolution. As an impartial observer,
Japan could be a particularly effective mediator in international conflicts. They would
especially like to see Japan play a stronger leadership role in East Asia to help ease
regional tensions, support fledgling democracies, foster multilateral cooperation, and use
its diplomatic power and prestige to promote regional interests.
Several university professors commented that the younger generation of Japanese are
more outward looking and have a much greater interest in and curiosity about other
countries than the older generation (although they did note that some students are woe･
fully ignorant about world history) 10). Young Japanese (especially young women) are
traveling m greater numbers than ever before, they have more exposure to foreign
cultures and ideas, and tend to be more realistic about international relations. On仙e
other hand, political pundits criticized most Japanese politicians as being weak in their
knowledge of foreign affairs and neglecting this important area to curry favor with
voters on domestic issues.
In terms of foreign economic assistance, Japan is already the world's largest donor,
contributing more than $13 billion dollars in overseas development assistance (ODA) in
2000, according to Foreign Ministry statistics. At the January 2002 donor conference to
the use of UN PKO forces for Macedonia, which China vetoed because that country had extended diplomatic
recognition to Taiwan.
10) One professor at a commercial college in Kyoto lamented that some of her students were not even aware
thaりapan had gone to war with the United States.
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raise money for reconstruction of Afghanistan, Japan pledged $500 million over the
next 2-1/2 years, second only to the United States. Foreign affairs scholars agree that
J apan should continue its humanitarian assistance programs and nation-building efforts,
and view ODA as an important foreign policy tool. But they feel that the international
community has not sufficiently recognized Japan's aid contributions. Moreover, they
emphasize that Japan should develop a coherent strategy for dispensing its foreign assis-
tance programs, specifying certain conditions for the aid and more closely monitor assis-
tance to avoid corruption and ensure maximum efficiencyll'. Economists also recom-
mend that Japan place greater focus on improvements in global and humanitarian
conditions仇at can be effected through research and development in agriculture and
food sciences, biotechnology, heal也and medicine, and other high-tech applications.
Recently, as Japan's own economic conditions steadily decline, Japanese taxpayers
increasingly feel that scarce budget resources should be devoted to domestic problems
rather than to shoring up developing economies that compete with their own12). Such
sentiments are particularly strong in the Kansai area, which has been especially hard hit
by也e economic recession.
Economic Issues
According to some Kansai economists, U. S.-Japan relations in the recent past have
been directly related to the strength of the U. S. economy. If the American economy
was healthy, then Japan enjoyed smooth relations with the United States; but if the
United States was experiencing economic problems, those problems gave rise to tension
in the relationship. Japan often seemed to be reacting to issues raised by the United
States, and the American government, particularly under the Clinton administration,
seemed to be fixated on仇e trade imbalance. During the 80's, economic and commercial
issues dominated the relationship, and high profile, sometimes protracted trade negotia-
tions led to increased friction between the two countries. Once the U. S. economy
gained momentum in the 90's, and the Japanese economy faltered by comparison, the
ll) The recent (February, 2002) scandal over Diet member Suzuki Muneo's alleged interference in ODA project
decisions has already focused Japanese public opinion on this area.
12) A recent article from the Asahi Shimbun cited China as an example: "China has borne the brunt of recent
(aid) reductions. Japanese lawmakers have found it increasingly difficult to explain to voters why their
government should dole out billions in aid to a country whose economy is growing 7 percent a year and that
is churning out low-cost exports that squeeze Japanese producers." Akiko Kashiwagi and Clay Chandler,
"Financial Ills Dent Japan's Readiness to Give Aid", Asahi Shimbun, February 2, 2002 , p. 5.
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friction decreased despite the continued high trade imbalance. Especially after Septem-
ber ll, the United States is less focused, for now, on international trade issues, and
U. S.-Japan relations have regained a greater sense of balance and global cooperation.
Still, economic observers report some residual resentment of what is viewed as exces-
sive U.S. pressure on the Japanese to mold their economic policy to suit U.S.
interests13'. A small minority claim thaりapan is a casualty of the global standards
imposed by the United States, a criticism more frequently heard in the developing
world. Some economists go so far as to attribute current Japanese economic problems
to the 1980's American policy of encouraging increased Japanese domestic spending and
consumption in order to bring down the trade imbalance. When the Japanese govern-
ment began funding large public works projects, there was a short-term boost to也e
economy, but the government funding only exacerbated the inefficient practices of the
Japanese business sector. (Other experts point out that the Japanese government took
the easy route by injecting large amounts of money into the economy through public
spending, but neglected more long-term and difficult but effective approaches such as
deregulation, financial system reform, and opening markets to foreign and domestic
competition.) Now the Koizumi government is faced with the challenge of eliminating
and reforming these huge quasi-official projects that have been draining the public
coffers and have left the country dotted with superhighways and bridges to nowhere14'.
From a local perspective, the depressed economy is也e single most important issue
to voters. The Kansai area has been hit even harder than Tokyo by the recession.
Whereas western Japan used to boast a thriving network of small and medium-sized
enterprises, many of these small businesses have been unable to weather the economic
storm. Large companies had already pulled out in the 90's, eliminating branch offices
and centralizing their operations in the capital. Heavy industries have decreased, there
13) The U. S. government seems to have learned from this criticism. Officials in the current Bush administration,
while generally supportive of Koizumi's reforms, have avoided (at least publicly) offering specific advice or
solutions to Japan's economic problems. In a February 2001 interview with the New York Times, U. S.
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill said, "Japan will no longer get Clinton-like lectures about how to reverse its
decade-long economic decline."
14) Yoichi Funabashi maintains that "No serious attempt has been made so far to reduce accumulating public
debt; instead, budgetary stimulus has been used as a desperate means to bring about economic recovery...
The official justification for accumulating public debt and the government's endless bond-issuing practices is
that economic recovery depends on massive injections of money. The truth is that these enormous
expenditures conveniently serve the pork-barrel politics of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) , as they keep
thousands of construction companies and more than six million employees engaged in government-funded
public works projects." See Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan's Moment of Truth", Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Winter
2001), pp. 73-8.
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is little new investment, bankruptcies and unemployment are steadily increasing. There
is a widespread perception that the government's economic policies have favored larger
companies and industries headquartered in Tokyo, and there is pressure on local poli-
ticians to redress this imbalance. Residents of western Japan were particularly
heartened by the appointment of Heizo Takenaka as the new Minister of Economic
Policy, since he is from Kansai and personally familiar with local conditions. Takenaka
has also instituted an ongoing consultative process with academic and private sector
experts in the Kansai and other regions, a move considered indicative of the new
cabinet's desire to stay in touch with the real world beyond the Tokyo ether. People are
hopeful but skeptical of Koizumi's planned economic reforms, and everyone, from
economists to factory workers to housewives, is waiting for results. Koizumi has warned
that the reforms will require sacrifices and hardships, and the weaker segments of the
population, the elderly, the unemployed, part-time workers, first-time job seekers and
single mothers, are fearful that the social safety net will be among也e first casualties.
Moreover, a reduction of public works projects will further damage the largely blue-
collar construction and manufacturing sectors that have a strong constituency in
Kansai.
Academics, politicians, economic experts and journalists all agree that economic
reform is long overdue. After the war, Japan enjoyed three decades of peace and pros-
penty during which the economy flourished. Economic prosperity came to be closely
associated with the existing political and economic structures ; since the system worked
so well, there was a strong resistance to change. Add to this the normal Japanese
propensity to be risk-averse, and the aforementioned system of symbiotic political and
economic interests, and you get the current phenomenon of the world's second largest
economy declining for ten straight years while its political leaders debate what should
be done to save it. Several economists ventured the theory that up until now, economic
conditions had not been desperate enough for the Japanese people to demand drastic
change. They argue that Japan has built up a huge reservoir of wealth and personal
savings, and until those residual resources are depleted and average people really begin
to suffer economically, the government will not be forced into action. But many believe
Japan has now reached that point of desperation.
To be sure, the economic problems are numerous, the solutions elusive. Japanese and
foreign economists seem to agree on the main problems: perhaps as much as $ 1 trillion
32 国際公共政策研究 第7巻第1号
worth of non-performing bank loans; continuing deflation; excessive and intrusive
government regulations ; an arcane financial structure and accounting system ; a closed,
highly regulated market ; underfunded pension funds and medical entitlement programs,
and government debt equal to almost 140% of GDP, higher than any other industrialized
nation, and consuming 65% of tax revenues in debt service alone. Japan's economic
problems are further complicated by the increasingly interdependent nature of the
global economy. As the world's s∝ond largest economic power, Japan's stagnating
economy has repercussions throughout the Asian region and the world, not least in the
United States. With an extensive network of mutual capital investments and as major
trading partners, the United States and Japan are both vulnerable to fluctuations in
each others economies. Thus the recent downturn in the U. S. economy has also had a
negative effect on Japan, especially in the areas of IT, airlines, shipbuilding and
manufacturing. Moreover, some economists warn that, in attempting to resolve the non-
performing loan crisis, Japanese banks and institutional investors may be forced to sell
mme of the estimated $ 350 billion in U. S. government bonds which也ey now hold and
which have helped to curb interest rates and fuel the American economy15'.
In June, 2001 , Prime Minister Koizumi announced a sweeping economic plan in which
he promised to implement structural reform, dispose of the bad loans, ease government
regulations, reduce publicly-funded corporations, reform public and private sector fiscal
policies, and pare down the budget deficit. (Kansai area officials and economists would
add to the list reform of the tax system, which they see as currently favoring lowly
populated rural areas ; they view a more equitable distribution of tax revenues as essen-
tial to the revitalization of urban areas and businesses.) But since Koizumi assumed
office in April 2001, the voters have seen no forward movement on his proposed plan,
and the economy has continued its downward spiral. Amid intense speculation on how
long the prime minister can sustain his popular support, economic experts in Kansai,
like many of their counterparts throughout the country, still feel that Koizumi re-
presents the best hope for economic reform in Japan. Although many Japanese believe
Koizumi has good ideas and the political will to implement them, Kansai observers
admit that his way is fraught with political obstacles : besides the expected antagonism
from the opposition parties, there is also opposition from within his own (LDP) party
15) For further discussion of this possible scenario, see Kenichi Ohmae, "Fixing Japan May Break America",
New Perspective Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 2001) pp. 39-41.
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factions anxious to preserve their special interests, not to mention resistance from an
entrenched government bureaucracy. Taking advantage of a recent decline in the prime
minister's popularity ratings, these elements have launched a campaign to criticize
Koizumi for failing to deliver a quick fix for the country's economic woes. None of my
interlocutors was willing to speculate how long Koizumi could survive in this political
maelstrom.
Domestic Politics
Although Japanese domestic politics may not have a direct bearing on U. S∴Japan
relations, they do have a significant influence on Japanese foreign policy, including
policy toward the United States. Most opinion leaders in western Japan agree that
Japanese politics is undergoing a major transition. Up until about nine years ago, Japan
was virtually a one-party country. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)16) had
maintained a solid majority in the national Diet since the party's inception in 1955, and
enjoyed an unbroken monopoly over the government ministries. Under the traditional
political structure, local politicians built up bases of political support among special
interest groups, organizations and labor unions (such as farmers, teachers, construction
workers, local businesses and industries, etc.) in exchange for pursuing也e political
agenda of their support groups. Kansai political analysts observe that this system
seemed to work fairly well until the late 1980's. They point out that Japan has a very
short history as a participatory democracy, since the populace only obtained voting
rights after World War II. Prior to that, citizens left the business of governance to the
"experts," and the remnants of this attitude carried over into modern times and con-
tnbuted to a traditionally low voting rate, which is still evident today17'. Besides, in the
postwar period Japan flourished for thirty years under the Liberal Democrats and the
16) Newcomers to Japanese politics should not be misled by the LDP party's name. As the Congressional
Research Service aptly puts it二H Long-time observers oHapanese politics often quip that the LDP is 'neither
liberal, nor democratic, nor a party.'It is not considered liberal because mosトthough by no means alトof
its members hail from the conservative end of the political spectrum in Japan. It is not considered demo-
cratic because major decisions typically have been made by party elders in closed-room sessions out of the
view of the public and with little input from the party's grassroots. Finally the LDP is not considered a politi-
cal party in the traditional sense because it has long been riven by clique-like factions that jealously compete
for influence with one another." Mark Manyin, "Japanese Political Developments," Japan-U. S Relations:
Issues for the 107th Congress, Congressional Research Service, IB-97004 (September 19, 2001) p. 12.
17) Japan's low voting rate is attributed to a combination of complacency, apathy and political alienation. In the
July 2001 , election for the lower house of the Diet, voter turnout was estimated at 56% ; in the Kobe mayoral
election held in October 2002, the voting rate was a mere 45%.
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existing political system; al也ough there was no evidence of a causal relationship, the
LDP nevertheless came to be equated with that happy state of affluent stability.
But, beginning in the late 1980's, a succession of political scandals caused an already
disinterested public to become increasingly disenchanted with politics in general and the
LDP in particular. The economic downturn of the 90 s underscored the ineffectiveness
and corruption of the traditional political system, and in 1993 the LDP for the first time
in history lost its majority in the Diet. Since then, although也e LDP has remained the
dominant party nationwide, neither the Liberal Democrats nor any other party have
been able to muster an absolute majority in也e legislature, and the parties have been
forced to resort to uneasy coalition governments. Thus we see the recent phenomenon
of the revolving prime minister, whereby the country has had nine prime ministers since
1990. In a jocular vein, one political analyst likened the Japanese political system to the
old fairy tale "The Emperor's New Clothes": the politicians spend their time maneuver-
ing for re-election,仇e prime minister serves to juggle all the political factions, and
everyone pretends not to notice that the bureaucrats actually run the government.
Meanwhile, the economy is in shambles and voters are defecting from traditional pohti-
cal parties at unprecedented rates.
Observers in western Japan report that, as the old political organizations break down,
more and more independent (mutohaso) voters are choosing candidates not on the basis
of their parties but their policies. Likewise, there are a growing number of unaffihated
candidates (mushozoku) responding to this trend, sometimes temporarily attaching
themselves to a party only for political expediency. (One successful Kansai Diet
member has changed parties in every election for the past 14 years, and has been con-
sistently reelected.) Some commentators attribute the changing political landscape to
generational differences. They note that the younger politicians are more active, open-
minded and policy-oriented; many have traveled abroad and have a more realistic grasp
of Japan's international position; they are genuinely concerned about Japan s political
and economic problems, and approach the voters directly with their ideas. But many
local politicians, while acknowledging仇at the label of independent candidate is trendily
appealing, contend that independent voters are much too fickle to be relied upon, and
that candidates are still bound by the traditional party system. Candidates cannot sim-
ply formulate their own policies and gain support to run for office without the backing
of a recognized political party. Thus, even while denouncing the system and wishing its
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demise, most politicians feel forced to strike an alliance with some political organiza-
tion, and the vicious cycle grinds on. However, some point out that, as the major parties
compete for voters no longer bound by traditional political allegiances, the party
policies are changing to respond more to the needs of the people.
At the local level, Kansai voters are not always mindful of U. S.-Japan relations or
foreign affairs in general. With the deepening economic recession in many sectors, "It's
the economy, stupid !" could be the mantra of politicians in western Japan. They would
like to see the central government maintain the status quo on security and international
issues while focusing all its attention on solving the country's economic problems.
Although the LDP is still the dominant party in the region, others such as the Demo-
cratic Party,仇e Clean Government Party (Komeito) , and the Socialist and Communist
Parties all have substantial appeal among the working class based on their stances on
practical issues such as employment, welfare, taxes, medical benefits, and child and
elderly care. But while local politicians may be elected on the basis of local issues, most
policy (including economic) debate and decisions take place in Tokyo, and local politi-
cians must adhere to the party policies set in the capital in order to maintain party
support.
At the national level, political disaffection among the general populace seemed to
peak by the spring of 2001, when former Prime Minister Mori staggered to the end of
his term wi也an abysmal 9% support rating. When the cabinet reshuffled, emerging
from the witch's brew was an unlikely hero in the figure of the enigmatic new Prime
Minister, Junichiro Koizumi. Charismatic and controversial, Koizumi quickly soared to
an 86% support rating with his unequivocal promise to implement structural reform
(kouzou kaikaku) of the Japanese economy. Kansai commentators, like their com-
patriots all over Japan, are sharply divided in their opinions of Koizumi and his ability
to turn也e economy around. Supporters (and much of the public, at least initially) view
him as the self-described "lone-wolf", boldly opposing the old guard factions that re-
present all that is failed and corrupt in the existing political system; his blunt i聖nner of
speaking, refreshing style and reformist stance have fired the imagination of a people
hungry for a leader. Critics, on the other hand, brand Koizumi as a political opportunist,
cynically cultivating a maverick image to capitalize on the public's craving for change.
They dismiss his popularity as shallow, based not on the substance of his policies but on
a personality cult that reduces politics to just another form of popular entertainment.
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Bo血admirers and detractors, however, welcome the lively public debate and heigh-
tened political interest spawned by the Koizumi phenomenon, and hope at least that
aspect continues.
A larger majority of academics, politicians and journalists in western Japan give a
more balanced assessment of Koizumi as a political realist with a reformist agenda.
Acknowledging that Koizumi himself is a product of the traditional ranks of也e LDP,
they still believe he has the heart of a reformer and也e determination to see his plans
through. In fact, political analysts maintain that Koizumi's ascendance is a tribute to
his political wiles. Koizumi needed the LDP to become Prime Minister in order to put
forward his reform proposals; in turn, his popularity helped carry many LDP candidates
to victory in the July, 2001 upper house election. Ironically, the mainstream LDP faction
is Koizumi's main obstacle in carrying out his reforms, which threaten the old political
power bases. Now Koizumi is caught in a delicate balancing act: as long as he can
maintain his popular support, the LDP cannot oust him from power ; but, in compromis-
ing parts of his reform program to ensure its passage through the legislature, Koizumi
jeopardizes his own integrity and raison d'etre in the public's eye. Koizumi's support
ratings plunged dramatically in February 2002, following his abrupt dismissal of the
popular Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, a fiercely independent reformer in her own
right '. Although a few news columnists are gleefully predicting Koizumi's imminent
demise, some political observers say that his drop in the polls was an inevitable
correction to a more realistic level. The popular rumor is that if the LDP fails to pass
his reform program, Koizumi will appeal to the will of the people by dissolving the
lower house and calling for new elections, perhaps even defecting to another party
(the Minshuto?) or forming his own party. For the American government, Koizumi has
not only proved to be a strong ally in the war against terrorism, but also appears to be
the best hope for Japan's economic recovery. In his February 2002, visit to Japan, U. S.
President George W. Bush enthusiastically praised Koizumi's leadership, reiterated his
confidence in Koizumi's economic reform plan, and renewed his pledge of continued
American cooperation19'. With political events and intrigues unfolding at an accelerat-
18) With the news of Tanaka's dismissal in February, Koizumi's support rating plummeted almost overnight
from about 78% to 45% ; at the time of this writing, his ratings had fallen even more to about 40%.
19) At their first summit in June 2001, Bush and Koizumi announced the establishment of a "U.S.-Japan
Economic Partnership for Growth." According to the press release issued at the summit, the Partnership is
`a cooperative mechanism through which the two countries will tackle a wide range of global, regional, and
bilateral economic and trade issues- The Partnership sets up a new structure for engagement that better
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ing pace, no one is able to forecast仇e Japanese political barometer from one day to the
next.
Media Image
Japan has the largest circulation of newspapers per capita of any country in the
world, and a highly developed broadcast system offering an extensive variety of
programming. But my interlocutors differed sharply on the quality of the news cover-
age. Many Kansai observers, with the notable exception of the journalists, felt that the
Japanese news media was not as mature as its Western counterpart. They charge仇at
the media does not fulfill its journalistic responsibility to keep the public fully informed
and to present a broad public debate of the issues. Academics point to a long tradition
whereby Japanese journalists developed close relationships with individual politicians
and had to be careful not to jeopardize their sources by betraying their trust. Some say
the media still retains the vestiges of this cozy relationship with the establishment, and
its objectivity is thereby compromised. Others allege that prominent journalists go
directly from elite universities to the large media companies, bypassing the real world
and never shedding their ivory tower perspectives. Furthermore, rather than using
investigative reporting to fulfill a watchdog function, the Japanese media generally
reports scandals or other negative reports only after they are publicly revealed by the
authorities. Not surprisingly, Kansai journalists disagree with this assessment, insisting
that the Japanese media is every bit as vigorous and objective in pursuit of也e tru也as
the Western press. But on both sides of the aisle there is unanimous agreement that the
mass media is a powerful force in shaping Japanese public opinion.
Residents of western Japan say that, in the past, most newspapers and television
stations seemed to provide much the same coverage, but in recent years they have
developed individual editorial positions that are readily discernible. For example, most
would agree that the Sankei Shimbun would be considered a conservative publication,
and that the Asahi represents the opposing liberal view (most prone to take an anti-
government stance), with the Yomiuri and the Mainichi Daily falling somewhere in
between, depending on仇e issue. The national dailies compete with local papers in
providing coverage of local political, social and economic events as well as editorial
reflects the importance that each country places on the other as a principal ally and largest overseas trading
partner.
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comments on local developments. There are also a number of monthly magazines that
publish commentary on a wide variety of current political and social topics. While some
television viewers complain about the excessive sensationalism of the political talk
shows, realists admit that the aggressively opinionated hosts (talento) are competing
for ratings in the Hinfotainment" category. More indirect and perhaps insidious,
however, is the selective presentation or interpretation of the facts to suit a company's
editorial policy. Although there is no such thing as complete objectivity (in any
country) and a certain amount of prioritizing is inevitable, academics claim that in the
case of the Japanese press the bias is sometimes blatant. As an egregious example,
foreign affairs experts cite press coverage of the U. S. bases in Okinawa. Almost all
reporting of issues relating to American military facilities is done by the local press in
Okinawa, and is picked up by the mainland press, complete with the local anti-military
stance. The Okinawa press often has a strong bias against the U. S. bases, exaggerating
仇e negative news and rarely reporting any favorable news relating to the military
facilities. The mass media is so one-sided on this issue that it's almost impossible for
Okinawans (and, by extension, most Japanese) to get a balanced view.
Many Kansai commentators believe that the Japanese public has a more sophisticated
grasp of the issues than media managers assume. Most Japanese have a healthy skepti-
cism of the media, and thinking people consult more than one news source to get a
variety of facts and opinions. While there is no doubt that the media strongly
influences public opinion, media managers also keep a wary eye on opinion polls and
adjust their editorial stance accordingly. In the waning days of the Mori administration,
for example, emboldened by the prime minister's sinking polls, the media bullied Mori
mercilessly, thereby contributing to his demise. By contrast, in the initial uncertain days
of the Koizumi administration, while the jury of public opinion was still out, some news-
papers ventured to criticize Koizumi, only to back off when it became clear that the
public was丘rmly in the Koizumi camp. Now that Koizumi's support ratings have
dropped, press criticism has increased proportionately, leaving one to wonder which is
the chicken and which the egg.
With respect to the United States and U. S.-Japan relations, media coverage is
extensive if not always balanced. Many Kansai observers noted that certain newspaper
and television companies, Asahi in particular, were consistently more critical of
American actions and policy, most recently the military action in Afghanistan, as
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evidenced both on their editorial pages and also in仇e selection and tone of仇e news
content. However, more disturbing than objectively anti-American editorial policies is
the general impression among my interlocutors that a more subtle negative image of the
United States is creeping into the media in news coverage itself and from there into the
Japanese psyche. Kansai commentators observe that average Japanese people seem to
make a clear distinction between the American people and their government. Accord-
ing to this view, the Japanese have generally positive impressions of American people
as friendly, sincere, hardworking and generous (among other qualities). Nat∬ally,
these favorable impressions are strongest among those Japanese who have lived or
traveled in the States or who have otherwise had personal contact with Americans
through their work, family, education, etc. Academics also point out that over the past
50 years the United States has built up a deep reservoir of good will among the
Japanese people, and that overall impressions of也e United States remain positive
among也e majority oHapanese20'.
But over the last few years, with the help of Japan's media managers, thin but un-
sightly cracks have begun to appear in the formerly placid image of the United States
as也e benevolent superpower. The United States is sometimes depicted as a bully that
uses its military, political and economic power in pursuit of its own interests, and
dominates international fora such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the IMF
to impose its own standards in the name of globalization. Likewise,組ere are occasional
signs of a nascent backlash against the perceived dominance of American culture.
Whereas a few years ago such sentiments might have been voiced in hushed tones in
private gatherings, or by radical fringe groups, nowadays they are being carried with
increased frequency by mainstream publications and popular television programs.
While some commentators dismiss such criticism as the envious resentment that is an
inevitable by-product of superpower-dom, others express more serious concern. Young
Japanese, like most youth anywhere, are not keen students of history; they are not
sipping from the reservoir of goodwill toward the United States, but drinking from the
trough of current events replenished daily by the J apanese media.
In contrast to this minority view, mainstream Kansai representatives believe that
most Japanese agree with the major policies of the United States, but may not always
20) In an October 2000 poll conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 73% of Japanese said they had a posi-
tive image of the United States.
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agree with the methods employed in developing and articulating those policies. In this
regard, the American government is sometimes viewed as shunning international consul-
tation and cooperation in favor of unilateralism, and as being culturally insensitive to
the views of other countries. Foreign affairs experts point out that, in actuality, U. S.
policy is usually thoroughly reasoned and well substantiated in fact; yet a pre-existing
image of the United States may at times color, even unconsciously, the public's percep-
tion or interpretation of the facts. Thus it is with a sense of disappointment that
Japanese friends express their concern that the media image at times overpowers the
real message on U. S.- related issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, Mideast peace, trade
disputes and the ABM treaty. Academics are also concerned about the broader scope of
an American fall from grace. If a negative image of the United States is appearing in
Japan, one of America's closest allies with a free press, then one can only imagine the
extent of misunderstanding in countries less favorably predisposed and with a controlled
media.
Implications for American Policy
A number of policy implications may be drawn both from the Japanese perspectives
expressed herein as well as in response to them. These implications may be stated in the
form of general principles for U. S. policy makers, many of which might apply to policy
towards other countries besides Japan.
l.Aim for greater policy consistency. Some interlocutors felt that U. S. policy toward
Japan has been somewhat inconsistent in recent years, with each change of political
administration bringing new policy makers with new philosophies, goals and styles in
American policy toward Japan. Often, the strength of U. S∴Japan relations seemed to
depend on the states of the respective economies. Sometimes different factions within
仇e U. S. government had opposing views and senりapanese leaders conflicting signals.
Kansai commentators suggest that both American and Japanese policy makers should
aim for greater stability in the long-term relationship and not allow it to be derailed by
petty or temporal differences, trade squabbles, minor incidents, or other bumps in the
political road. One recommendation to solidify the relationship would be to further
strengthen the many working level groups focusing on specific bilateral areas : security,
economic and political. These should not just be crisis-driven or problem-centered, but
rather should make use of the relatively quiet periods in the relationship to build solid
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foundations and systems that can weather the stormy times. Also, Japan and the United
States could increase both the stability and breadth of the relationship by expanding
cooperation on global issues such as health and population, the environment, narcotics
control, technology, economic development, etc.
2.Treat Japan like an equal partner. A common perception voiced by many of my
interlocutors was that Japan continues to play a subordinate role vis-a-vis the United
States, whether it be in the security alliance, economic issues or political affairs. While
many foreign affairs specialists say the Japanese government is partially to blame for
its complicity in this arrangement, some feel that American leaders still define the alii-
ance in terms of Japan's agreeing to U. S. foreign policies rather than developing its
own independent policies. Others say that Americans seem to have an innate prejudice
that only military power equates to political power. Japanese sensitivity to its perceived
inferior status was underscored recently when也e inadvertent omission oHapan from a
list of allies participating in the Afghan campaign caused a stir in the local press (but
was barely mentioned in the Western press). Kansai observers believe that a more
active and independent Japanese foreign policy would not only benefit Japan but would
also serve the United States as an objective touchstone: the honest view of a trusted
ally who has也e confidence to differ. Many would agree with the Armitage Report's
view of "the special relationship between血e United States and Great Britain as a
model for the alliance"21'. Japan is already respected as an economic and political
leader in Asia, where many nations look to Japan as a spokesman for regional interests
in fora such as the G-8, OECD, and APEC. Japan could play an expanded role as a
conduit between the United States and other Asian countries. Moreover, Japan's lack of
military prowess and self-avowed neutrality would make it an ideal candidate to serve
as mediator or intermediary in conflicts worldwide, a role that Japan has heretofore
been reluctant to assume. As previously noted, Japan is already the world's second
largest aid provider and, wi仇its advanced technology and skilled human resources,
could become a world leader in multinational efforts to resolve global problems.
3.Be attentive to local conditions. In western Japan as well as other parts of the
country, politicians are elected not on the basis of their foreign policies but on the basis
of local issues. "All politics are local", even in Japan. Residents of western Japan main-
21) Armitage et al. op. at. p.6.
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tain that it is especially important to consider the views of people outside the capital,
since they are more representative of the common people and more indicative of the
future direction of the country. To the extent that American policy makers understand
Japanese domestic conditions and the driving forces behind Japanese politics, they can
better understand the influences and pressures on Japanese leaders and policy formula-
tion. This understanding should extend to an awareness of cultural and historical con-
texts that may influence foreign relations, policies, and even negotiating styles. Kansai
observers also note that, in general, Japanese people seem to know much more about
the United States than Americans know about Japan, which often seems limited to out-
dated stereotypical images. While admitting it is natural that the entire world is inter-
ested in and affected by American policies, foreign affairs experts caution that what
American policy makers don't know about other countries can hurt them. What is
more, they are concerned about a thin but persistent isolationist streak that recurs in
the United States, particularly during troubled times. In an increasingly interdependent
global community, isolationism is viewed as an anachronism that is incompatible with
the status of superpower.
4.Nurture a positive image. It is a source of puzzlement to many Japanese that the
United States, home of Hollywood and the world's most sophisticated communications
industry, does not always succeed in projecting a positive image abroad. Today, there
seems to be a growing disparity between the perception that Americans hold of them-
selves and the way they are perceived in other parts of the world, even in friendly
countries like Japan. My interlocutors felt that the international image of the United
States should not be entrusted solely to the random whims of foreign editors, who may
or may not give a complete and objective rendition of the facts. Several journalists and
academics in western Japan suggest that the United States could benefit from an even
more assertive public relations function to project a more positive image worldwide.
This is meant not in a cynical sense of manipulating public opinion with propaganda,
but in the true sense of more actively disseminating information on American activities
and policies. For instance, U. S. opposition to the Kyoto Protocol and to the ABM
treaty bo也received wide coverage, mostly negative, in the Japanese press. Yet a closer
look at the newspaper articles on these issues reveals very little substance on the actual
content of the U. S. policy and the reasons for the American stance on these issues. To
this day, most of the Japanese public retains only a vague notion that the American
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policy positions are "bad" in opposing these "good" treaties.
Foreign affairs experts suggest that the United States increase and expand current
public relations activities such as speeches, radio and television talk show appearances,
newspaper commentaries, and panel discussion programs to reach a wider audience.
Besides providing facts and explanations of current policy issues, the United States
could also increase public awareness of its innumerable positive activities, with particu-
lar emphasis on the areas most affecting the host country. Since the foreign press tends
to focus on negative or controversial issues, the Japanese public may be largely un-
aware of the less newsworthy but very socially worthy U. S.-sponsored economic,
humanitarian and development assistance programs. Moreover, the United States could
help to foster a more objective and sophisticated domestic media in Japan by promoting
more journalist training programs, internships, exchanges, seminars, etc. Lastly, in addL
tion to the more immediate and direct media resources, existing educational and
cultural exchange programs such as international visitors and scholars, sister city
programs, academic and student exchanges are all excellent means of building long
term bilateral understanding and should be continued and expanded.
5.Lead as a great power, not a mere superpower. At this particular moment in
history, it is the singular destiny of the United States to be the earth's only superpower,
encompassing with it not only the heady glory of unprecedented power but also the
terrific responsibility to use it wisely. In Japan (as in many other parts of the world)
the exercise of wisdom entails a certain degree of modesty, a recognition that one does
not have all the answers, and a willingness to learn from others. A great power is
magnanimous in its leadership, consults and heeds the opinions of others, and truly
values the role and contributions of "lesser" powers. From a position of strength one is
not afraid to cooperate and even to compromise. Above all, a great power should be
seen as advancing the common good and improving也e overall condition of mankind
and the earth. Most Kansai observers emphasize that the majority of Japanese firmly
support U. S. military actions against terrorism, and acknowledge that the use of force
is regrettably sometimes necessary. However, many just as firmly believe it is within
the power of仇e United States to prevent and resolve most major world conflicts. Isn't
that, after all, what a superpower is for?! As strange as it may seem to (some)
Americans, some Japanese hold greater hopes and aspirations for the United States than
Americans仇emselves might articulate. Possessing unparalleled wealth, unchallenged
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military might, and inestimable human resources, the United States is seen as having the
unique opportunity to preside over a Utopian world of peace and prosperity guaranteed
by aりPax Americana". While such sentiments may sound naive to American leaders
grappling with the harsh complexities of the modern world, they nonetheless reveal the
stark standards to which those leaders are being held. Foreign affairs experts in west-
ern Japan believe that most Japanese sincerely want the United States to provide the
wise leadership which the world so desperately needs and which only the Americans
seem to be in a position to provide. And they would urge American policy makers to
rise to the occasion and lead, not from a standpoint of unilateral self-interest, but with a
wider vision of global interest.
